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REMARKS OF JUAN F. PEREAt
2
Like my colleagues, Richard Delgado1 and Frank Wu, I
think affirmative action is the wrong debate to have because it
focuses our attention on the wrong questions. As a way of
illustrating this point, I have tried to cull out of Brown 3 and
Grutter4 some very basic, plain-English questions that the cases
seem to have answered. For me, this is helpful in understanding
why we are asking the wrong questions with respect to
affirmative action.
It seems to me that Brown answered the question, "Can we
keep them out of our schools by law?"--we," of course, being the
white majority, and "they" being persons of color. 5 The Brown
Court answered no.
Now consider affirmative action and the question changes
somewhat. The question generally seems to become something
like "Despite their lesser qualifications, 6 how many of them shall
we let into our colleges, universities, and workplaces?" If I
translate the terms of strict scrutiny into plain English, I come
up with two questions. First, "How compelling is it for us to let
them into our institutions?" The narrow tailoring component

t Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law,
University of Florida, Levin College of Law.
I Richard Delgado is currently a Professor of Law and Derrick A. Bell Fellow at
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. He is a prominent figure in the Critical
Race Theory movement and the author of numerous books and articles on the
subject. See e.g., Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Or,
Do You Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991).
2 Frank Wu is a Professor of Law at Howard University School of Law and is
also an adjunct Professor at Columbia University. He is the author of YELLOW:
RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002).
3 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
5 Subsequent references to "we" or "us" and "them" or "their" are used similarly.
"We" generally refers to the white Majority or white decision makers, and "them,"
"they" and "their" generally refer to persons of color, blacks and Latinos in
particular.
6 While I do not accept the validity of measures that produce disproportionate
numbers of 'esser qualified" blacks and Latinos, nor the validity of many measures
of so-called "merit," I recognize the value judgments that are made on the basis of
such measures.
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can be worded as follows: "How minimally intrusive on the
7
expectations and interests of white students is it?"
These are the wrong questions to ask because they pose
questions of fundamental fairness and justice as issues fit for
majoritarian discretion and decision. 8
There is a kind of
majoritarian noblesse oblige in the questions as I formulated
them and as the Court answers them. The Court has phrased
affirmative action, an issue of fairness and remedy, in the
language of majoritarian utility rather than in the language of
justice.
The Court will decide what constitutes utility-today it is
diversity-and for how long diversity will remain useful. The
Court's conception of utility will also define the duration of
affirmative action. Remarkably, Justice O'Connor offered her
gratuitous prognostication that affirmative action should not be
necessary after twenty-five years. 9 To anyone with a sense of
history and a sense of the amount of racism yet to be remedied in
America, Justice O'Connor's statement is incomprehensible.
The Court's current approach to affirmative action is wrong
precisely because the Court inquires only with regard to
majoritarian utility, costs and benefits. These are the wrong
questions because they discourage and avoid historical inquiry
into the scope of racial injustice. The Court's reasoning promotes
denial of our history of racism. The Court makes our history of
racial injustice seem irrelevant and increasingly remote in time
and in public consciousness.
The Court's reasoning avoids
consideration of an adequate remedy for our country's long and
continuing history of race-based denial of educational
opportunities to blacks and Latinos. 10 The Court's rhetoric
encourages a debate focusing on educational benefits, or the lack
thereof, rather than a debate focused on the resolution of issues
of racial injustice and fairness.

7 Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (considering whether
an affirmative action plan unnecessarily trammels the interests of non-minority
employees).
8 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 1225.
9 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2347.
10 For one article describing the scope of educational segregation and
discrimination against Latinos, see Juan F. Perea, Buscando Amirica: Why
Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420
(2004).
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Instead of endless, repetitive debates about affirmative
action-which will now become heated debates about the
educational value or not of diversity-we should ask a different
set of questions. We should ask: "What can we do to produce an
adequate remedy for a long history of racial discrimination in
education?" "What is a fair distribution of educational resources
and professional opportunities among all our people?" "How do
we best accomplish such a fair distribution?"
For the record, I support affirmative action. I support
anything that leads to a fairer distribution of educational
opportunities.
From my perspective, however, the diversity
rationale upon which the Court relies is weak. I would like to
mention a few of its weaknesses, especially those implicated by
the questions that I have just posed. As many speakers have
already stated, affirmative action is not nearly enough.
The diversity rationale is ultimately a utilitarian rationale
for a project that should instead be founded on principles of
justice as a remedy for past and present discrimination. The
utility of educational benefits is measured from a majoritarian
point of view. The majority could, of course, easily decide that
the benefits are no longer worth it, despite the fact that a
remedy is still necessary. 1 ' As I described earlier, a rationale of
diversity and educational benefits encourages the wrong debate.
We are focusing too much attention on whether there are
educational benefits, rather than on the demands of justice.
Instead of noticing the massive injustices surrounding us, we are
encouraged to consider only "How much of this affirmative action
are we willing to allow and justify?"
Part of the instrumental value of diversity for majoritarian
purposes is that it legitimizes elite majoritarian institutions and
their exclusionary admissions standards: the Court expressed
something like this when it wrote that "[i]n order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented
12
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."'
Therefore, diversity is posited as valuable because it legitimizes
elite, white-controlled institutions like universities, major
industries, and the military.

11 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 1223-24.
12 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
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From my perspective, the far better rationale is to
understand that persons of color are entitled, by right, to a fair
share of all the valuable opportunities our society has to offer.

